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ABSTRACT
There is a rich stream of research focusing on employee non-/compliance with
information security policies. However, this stream suffers from inconsistent, even contradicting
results and lack of theorical congruence. Attempts to explain such inconsistencies have included
investigation of possible moderating effects of contextual variables. We further investigate these
inconsistencies by analytically disentangling the consistency in the implementation of the four
most used variables of Protection Motivation Theory—Perceived severity, Perceived
susceptibility, Response efficacy, and Self-efficacy—across the research field. Specifically, we
address the following research question; what inconsistencies, if any, are there in the use of
Protection motivation theory in non-/compliance research?
We find that three of the variables analyzed have been ascribed more than one theoretical
property across the seven studies reviewed, thereby making it problematic to fully understand
their cause-and-effect relationships. That is, it is unclear which property that explains employees’
intention to comply with IS policies, whether they have the same effects, or have an increased
effect when applied in conjunction. This study contributes to the literature by proposing that
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inconsistent results may not only be due to omitted moderating factors, but also to theoretical
properties of key variables being inconsistently defined and measured.
Keywords: Protection Motivation Theory, PMT, Non-compliance, Inconsistent results,
Variable properties, Consistent theory usage

1. INTRODUCTION
Research on employee non-/compliance with security policies has grown substantially
from the first contributions in the early 1990s (Straub 1990). This research has not only brought
about a more nuanced understanding of the complex phenomenon, but also resulted in a vast
research landscape based on multiple theoretical perspectives, often behavioral theories borrowed
from other research disciplines and tailored to the context of non-/compliance (Moody et al.
2018; Sommestad et al., 2014; Cram et al. 2017; 2019).
As the research field has matured, numerous literature reviews have been conducted,
observing several problems regarding how research is carried out. For instance, Sommestad et al.
(2014), Vance et al. (2012) and Cram et al. (2017; 2019) observed that there are several
inconsistent, or even contradicting, research results and that there is a lack of theorical
congruence. They found that relationships between the same set of variables have different
directions and different effect sizes in different articles
Attempts to explain such inconsistencies include investigation of possible moderating
effects inflicted by external factors, that is, contextual factors that can explain why directions and
effect sizes differ between studies (Cram et al. 2019). However, even after such extensions, many
inconsistencies remain (Cram et al. 2019). There is therefore a need to also consider internal
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influencing factors, that is, how theories are used in different studies. In that vein, Sommestad et
al. (2014) suggested two internal factors they believe could help explain the conflicting results:
differences in studies quality and differences among studies with respect to research method.
However, they did not test these internal factors as “few studies included in this review overlap
with each other with respect to the variable-relationship they measure” (p 59). To test theory
consistency between studies, we need a large sample of studies investigating the same
relationship among variables. In this study, therefore, we set out to test theory consistency on a
larger set of studies.
As suggested by a recent literature review (Cram et al. 2019), there is a limited number of
what they refer to as, primary theoretical/conceptual bases. Specifically, they identify four
theories which can be seen as representing the core of the field: Protection motivation theory
(PMT), Theory of planned behavior (TPB), Rational choice theory (RCT) and Deterrence theory
(DT). Out of these four theories, PMT, has been particularly discussed in terms of how it is used
within the research field (Johnston et al. 2015; Haag et al. 2021).
Therefore, before investigating the entire spectrum of theories, we conduct this pilot study
of PMT to identify if the problem of inconsistencies exists and, if so, the potential consequences
of it. We draw on previous reviews, but rather than focusing on summing up what we know thus
far in terms of empirical findings and examining external factors explaining inconsistencies, we
focus on how the variables of PMT are used in non-/compliance research.
We also discuss their implications for future research in this area. In so doing, we draw
upon Luft and Shield’s (2003) highly influential paper in management accounting which
compares definitions and applications of variables, and relations among variables. This offers the
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opportunity for us to test the PMT theory consistency within the field and to enhance our
understanding of the inconsistent study results. More specifically, this study asks,
What inconsistencies, if any, are there in the use of Protection motivation theory in non/compliance research?
By inconsistencies we refer to definition and item measurements of variables.
We investigate that by categorizing the properties of each variable and analyzing the
consistency across the selected studies. In so doing, we illustrate how the research field is
currently studied as concerns the PMT variables. Based on these findings, we suggest interesting
paths for future research.
2. PMT AND VARIABLES
PMT is defined in various ways. The original version, from psychology, includes a large
number of variables but studies in compliance research typically draw on a smaller set (Haag et
al. 2021). We have here considered as the “basis model” the one from Moody et al. (2018), which
comprises the independent variables of severity, susceptibility, response efficacy, and self-efficacy
and the dependent variable of intention, as Haag et al. (2021) found these variables to be, by a
large extent, most frequently used in non-/compliance research.
2.1 Variables
A first observation is that studies based on PMT almost always add new variables, often
taken from other behavioral theories, such as TPB. Previous reviews (Cram et al. 2017; 2019;
Sommestad et al. 2014; Haag, Siponen and Liu 2021), however, have noted that these new
variables oftentimes represent the same, or very similar, phenomena, only with different labels.
Moreover, it has also been recognized that variables with the same name not necessarily represent
the same phenomena. For example, the definition of the variable reward differs between Siponen
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et al. (2015) and Vance et al. (2012). This means that the content of variables must be closely
inspected, in order the fully understand the underlying cause-and-effect.
We map the cause-and-effect logic for each variable from PMT following the Luft and
Shields (2003) description of good variable practice. Luft and Shields (2003) stress the
importance of being precise in defining and operationalizing variables. They distinguish between
what they call practice defined variables, and theory defined variables, based on the way
variables are defined and the structure/arrangement of their properties. Practice defined variables
draw upon the language of practitioners to describe that of interest. For example, practitioners
may be interested in the effects of “security awareness training programs” and “information
security policies” on employees’ intention to comply with IS policies. While an advantage of this
type of variable is that they make intuitive sense to most practitioners, a disadvantage is that they
are typically broadly defined. A single variable often includes several properties, some of which
may be irrelevant to the research question at hand. For example, a “security awareness program”
may update employees on (1) the severity of IS threats, (2) the vulnerability of IS threats, and (3)
the skills required to effectively deal with the threat (e.g., Hina Selvam & Lowry 2019), Such
variables, containing multiple properties, can have different causes and effects (Luft and Shields
2003, p.188).
In contrast, theory defined variables are characterized by “well-defined, stable, unitary
meanings making it possible to identify consistent cause-and- effect relations” (Luft & Shields
2003, p. 188). A theory defined variable contains only one property that is specifically tailored to
a particular research question, and explains, or is explained by, variations in the property of
another theory defined variable.
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In conclusion, “a variable too broadly defined relative to the underlying theory generates
noise in the cause– effect relation and makes it less likely that the effects specified in the theory
will be detected, even when they exist. Too broad [of] a definition also makes it more likely that
effects other than those specified in the theory will be detected and wrongly interpreted […]. In
contrast, a variable too narrowly defined captures only part of the proposed cause–effect relation
and also makes it less likely that the effects specified in theory will be detected, even when they
exist” (Luft and Shields 2003, p. 189).
This line of reasoning is applicable also to the operationalization of variables into
measurement instruments as there may be a discrepancy between what we claim/aim to measure
(property of the variable, defined in our variable definition) and what we actually measure (e.g.,
items in a questionnaire). That is, a measurement instrument may contain items which only
capture fragments of the proposed property or items which do not correspond well to the property
or capture several properties (not in line with the variable definition), thereby increasing the risk
of drawing invalid conclusions. Accordingly, we here not only look at variable definitions but
also at how the variables are operationalized. This is done by comparing the measurement items
with the variable description/properties.
With this in mind, it should be noted that even though a variable may originate from a
known theory (in our case PMT), they can still contain characteristics of a practice defined
variable in the study, depending on how the authors chose to define and measure it. Thus,
practice and theory defined variables should be seen as two ends on a spectrum rather than two
distinctive categories.
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3. METHOD
As this is a pilot study and we wanted to identify possible discrepancies in the use of PMT
–not necessarily finding all there may be – we selected seven articles using PMT. The selection
was made from a set of 35 (PMT) articles that we found in a literature search covering the past 10
years. Because we looked for differences, we selected studies that had come to different
conclusions. We also made sure to include different authors and different journals.
3.1 Coding and analysis
The coding process comprised two steps. The first included systematically extracting the
same type of variable information from each study and from this, categorize each variable’s
inherent properties. In the second step we compared the studies.
Step 1, analyzing variables. Using a standardized form, based on Luft and Shields (2003),
we extracted each variable definition from all studies, i.e., the word-by-word definition of each
variable. Next, we extracted all questionnaire items used to measure the variable (only one
article, Blythe and Coventry (2018), did not provide a full list of measure items).
From the variable definition and items, we categorized each variable’s properties. For
example, Ifinedo (2012) defined Perceived vulnerability as: "an individual’s assessment of the
probability of threatening events." (p. 84). From this definition we can draw that the property
proposed (cause-and-effect) is linked to the probability of a threatening event. The same thing
can be done for the questionnaire items. Using Ifinedo (2012) again, one item is designed as:
“More and more serious information security threats are being faced by my organization” (p. 92),
which also refers to probability of a threatening event. Thereby, the identified property (causeand-effect) in this cause is probability (cause).

Proceedings of the 16th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Austin, TX, December 12, 2021.

7

Gerdin et al.

We focused on the “basic” PMT as defined by the Moody et al. (2018) which uses the
variables perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy. One
reason for not including variables that other studies have used to amend the theory, such as
response cost and/or rewards, is due to their limited usage (Haag et al. 2021). Another reason is
that this is a pilot study only looking for the existence of inconsistencies and not aiming at
identifying all consistencies there may be.
Step 2, comparing studies. Having identified properties for each variable from every
study, we created variable-tables in which we grouped all properties found for each variable (e.g.,
see Table 1). From these tables it is easy to pinpoint discrepancies.
4. RESULT
We present the result by variable: perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, selfefficacy, and response efficacy.
4.1 Perceived Severity
The variable Perceived Severity was used in all the seven studies investigated, although in
two instances under different names. Hooper and Blunt (2020) use the name “Perceived impact”
and Menard, Bott and Crossler (2017) use “Threat severity”, but from the variable description
and the measurement items it is evident that all studies refer to the same core variable property,
namely, to the consequences of a threat. Thus, the variable is defined in line with good variable
practice in this small set of articles.
However, when dissecting the questionnaire items used to measure this variable, we find
important, yet unacknowledged, nuances regarding the properties of consequences. Some studies
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explore consequences related to the organization while others explore consequences related to
the individual (examples in Table 1).
These differences are not present in the variable definitions. All studies either directly
refer to consequences for the organization or do not clearly state who are affected by the
consequences. Hence, the measurement items are not always in line with the variable definitions:
we found several instances where the consequences are not connected to the organization but to
the individual employee (see examples in Table 1). Thus, we have a potential problem insofar
that some studies define the consequences as strictly organizational but in fact measure
consequences for the individual. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that this inconsistency leads to
different cause-effect relations between this variable and others. For example, it may well be that
perceived severity of a particular threat may be greater if the consequences are linked to the
individual (e.g., in terms of job loss, public shaming, and/or risk of punishment from employer)
than if the organization suffers the consequences (e.g., in terms of reputation and financial
losses), or vice versa. Whether or not this is the case is an empirical question.
Table 1
Perceived Severity
– Properties
Perceived
consequences
for
the organization

Perceived
consequences
the individual

for

Illustrative examples of definition from studies
“Severity is the level of the potential impact of the
threat (i.e., its severity and how severe the damage that
it can cause). In our context, it refers to the severity of
the IS security breach, and the possible negative event
caused by the breach in an organization.” (Vance et al.
2012)
“perceived impact can be defined as an IT employee’s
perception of the organizational consequences of the
threat. This includes the immediate impact, such as the
loss of confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of
the data stored in an information system, and the longterm effect on the business, such as reputational damage
and legal or regulatory action.” (Hooper et al. 2020)
No studies include individual consequences in their
definitions of the variable Perceived Severity

Illustrative examples of survey items
from studies
“An information security breach in my
organisation would be a serious problem
for my organization.” (Siponen et al. 2014)
"The impact [on] my organisation would
be ________ if a business-critical
information system was unavailable for a
prolonged period." (Hooper et al. 2020)
"The impact on my organisation would be
________ if confidential information was
disclosed to an unauthorised party."
(Hooper et al. 2020)
“An information security breach in my
organization would be a serious problem
for me” (Siponen et al. 2014)
“An information security breach in my
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organization would be a serious problem
for me” (Vance et al. 2012)
“If my work device were infected by
malware, I could be severely disciplined”
(Menard et al. 2017)
Mix
of
the
identified properties
above

“Perceived severity is "the negative consequences an
individual associates with an event" (e.g., a security
threat). For malware threats, this may be consequences
towards employees' productivity, the functioning of
their devices and their organisation's reputation.”
(Blythe and Coventry 2018)

4.2 Perceived vulnerability
The variable perceived vulnerability was found in all seven studies although sometimes
under slightly different labels, such as threat susceptibility (Menard et al. 2017) and perceived
susceptibility (Blythe and Coventry 2018). Here, we find clear differences regarding both
variable definitions and questionnaire items used. We can identify two distinct types of
vulnerability, which may not necessarily have the same cause-effect relations to other variables.
The first type refers to the individual’s perception of the probability/likeliness that a threat
will occur if no countermeasures are being taken (examples in Table 2). The second type,
however, refers to the individual’s perception of how vulnerable the organization is to said threat
(Table 2). To illustrate the importance of this difference, consider a bank employee who may
very well feel that the bank is very likely to encounter security threats due to the nature of the
business. However, the same employee may not necessarily feel that the organization is
vulnerable to these threats, due to the sophisticated security systems the bank has in place. These
two distinct properties of the ‘Perceived vulnerability’ variable may have different cause-andeffect relationships with other variables, and hence they should be investigated separately. In fact,
as of today, we do not know whether it is the perceived likeliness/probability of a threat, or the
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organization vulnerability to such threat the explain employees’ intention to comply with ISpolicies, or whether they have the same effects.
Table 2
Perceived
Vulnerability
–
Properties
Probability/likeliness
of being exposed

Illustrative examples of definition from studies

Illustrative examples of survey
items from studies

"Perceived vulnerability, i.e., an individual’s assessment of the
probability of threatening events." (Ifinedo 2012)

“I could be subjected to a serious
information
security
threat.”
(Ifinedo 2012

"Vulnerability is to the probability that an unwanted incident
will happen if no actions are taken to prevent it.” (Vance et al.
2012)

Vulnerability

"With respect to safe computing in the organization, individuals
who are of the view that they are invulnerable to security
threats are more likely not adhere security measures at work.”
(Ifinedo 2012)
"Threat susceptibility refers to the degree to which someone
feels vulnerable to a particular threat." (Menard et al. 2017)

“My organization could be
subjected to a serious information
security threat.” (Ifinedo 2012)
“More
and
more
serious
information security threats are
being faced by my organization”
(Ifinedo 2012)
"It is ________ that a security
incident will occur at my
organisation that will result in a
business-critical
information
system being unavailable for a
prolonged period." (Hooper et al.
2020)
"It is ________ that a security
incident will occur at my
organisation that will result in
confidential information being
disclosed to an unauthorised party"
(Hooper et al. 2020)
"It is ________ that a security
incident will occur at my
organisation that will result in the
integrity of information stored in a
system
being
compromised."
(Hooper et al. 2020)

4.3 Self-efficacy
The variable self-efficacy was used in all seven studies, and in all cases labeled the same.
However, an analysis of the definitions in different studies reveals two distinct properties. The
first property refers to the individuals’ subjective judgement of /belief in their ability to perform
the expected security behavior while the second one refers to an actual objective
ability/capability/competence of the individual to comply with the expected security behavior
(examples in Table 3).
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These two properties are not necessarily interchangeable. An employee may very well
have high belief in her/his ability to undertake protective behavior, but still have limited actual
ability or competence to do so may (and vice versa).
We also observe that researchers sometimes mix these two properties in their definitions
as well as in their questionnaire items (Table 3). In some studies, the definition of the variable
refers to one property and the measurement items refer to the other.
Table 3
Self-Efficacy
– Properties
Confidence/belief in
its
ability
to
performance
expected
security
behavior

(objective)
Ability/capability
/competence
to
follow
expected
security behavior

Illustrative examples of definition from studies
“Self-efficacy is the confidence an individual possesses in
effectively performing the recommended response" (Menard et
al. 2017)”
"self-efficacy (the degree that he or she believes it is possible to
implement the protective behavior)". --- "Self-efficacy in our
study, refers to employees’ belief that they can successfully
comply with IS security policies, which should enhance
compliance with policies and procedures" (Vance et al. 2012)

“self-efficacy emphasizes the individual’s capabilities and
competence to cope with the task or make a choice” (Blythe and
Coventry 2018).

Illustrative examples of survey
items from studies
“I believe that I have the
necessary skills to protect myself
from
information
security
violations.” (Hina et al. 2019)
“I believe that I have developed
the capability to prevent people
from getting my confidential
information.”
(Hina et al. 2019)
“Doing the opposite of what the
[scenario character] did would
be difficult for me to do.”
(Vance et al. 2012)
“Doing the opposite of what the
[scenario character] did would
be easy for me to do.” (Vance et
al. 2012)
“It is easy for me to perform the
information security behaviour
required by my organisation.”
(Hooper et al. 2020)
“It is difficult for me to perform
the
information
security
behaviour required by my
organisation.” (Hooper et al.
2020)

Mix
of
above
identified properties

“Self-efficacy can be defined as “an individual's beliefs about
their competence to cope with a task and exercise influence over
the events that affect their lives” (Bandura, 1977). In a security
context, employees who have high security-related capabilities
are presumed to be more likely to follow security practices as
they are more effective in learning how to follow them and being
able to perform the appropriate behaviour.” (Blythe and
Coventry 2018)
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“Self-efficacy eth is factor emphasizes the individual’s ability or
judgment regarding his or her capabilities to cope with or
perform the recommended behavior” (Ifinedo 2012)
"a person's belief in their ability to perform a recommended
behavior and effectively deal with a threat (e.g., their skill and
judgement abilities for dealing with a security breach risks)"
(Hina et al. 2019)

4.4 Response Efficacy
The variable Response efficacy was used in all seven studies. This is the only variable
consistently defined among all researchers, addressing only one theoretical property, namely the
individual’s perception of the effectiveness of recommended coping response (see Column 2 in
Table 4). Also, all studies analyzed used questionnaire items which operationalize this particular
property and they have done so in a consistent way (Table 4).
Table 4
Response
Efficacy
–
Property
Individuals’
beliefs
in
effectiveness
of
the
recommended
response

Illustrative examples of definition from studies

Illustrative examples of survey
items from studies

"Response efficacy refers to an individual’s perception of how well
the recommended response addresses the threat at hand (e.g.,
follow security policy)" (Menard et al. 2017)

“Complying
with
information
security policies in our organization
keep IS security breaches down”
(Siponen et al. 2014)

"response efficacy (the belief in the perceived benefits of the
coping action by removing the threat)" (Vance et al. 2012)
"[…] one's judgment of how effective a person believes a
recommended response will be should they follow it. In our
context, for example, response efficacy would be an employee's
belief that following an organizationally recommended security
procedure will actually prevent a threat " (Hina et al. 2019)

“Careful compliance with IS security
policies helps to avoid IS security
problems.” (Vance et al. 2012)
“In my institution, the available
security measures to protect my work
information from security violations
are effective.” (Hina et al. 2019)

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study investigated what inconsistencies, if any, are there in the use of Protection
motivation theory in non-/compliance research? “Inconsistencies” refers to description and item
measurements of variables. We investigated seven studies using PMT to see if there is reason to
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believe that differences in definitions and use of variables may be a reason for differences in
research results.
We found that three out of four variables – perceived vulnerability, perceived severity,
and self-efficacy – contained more than a single property, making it problematic to fully
understand the cause-and-effect relationship proposed. Thus, we cannot know which property
explains employees’ intention to comply with IS policies, whether they have the same effects, or
have an increased effect when applied in conjunction.
Even though we investigated a small number of studies, this shows that the use of PMT is
not consistent across studies. Moreover, we discovered occurrences of inconsistent variable
properties within individual studies. Thus, our study adds to the discussion about reasons behind
the inconstant results plaguing the field of non-compliance research by showing that property
variance is a potential explanatory factor. Thus, our result ties well into research in the likes of
Cram et al. (2019) and Sommestad et al. (2014) as we identify potential factors which may be the
cause for the inconsistent results within the non-/compliance research field. Indeed, we argue that
our study is a first start to decipher an important piece of the jigsaw puzzle, that of examining
theoretical congruence within a single study, as opposed to investigating external moderators
which the previously authors chose to. Moreover, our study further contributes to the discussion
about the use of the PMT in the non-/compliance research, as we in line with Johnston et al
(2015) and Haag et al (2021) observe various implementations.
As our sample is small, there is of course a need to investigate to what extent this is a
problem for the field in its entirety, including both the use of other theories and a larger set of
PMT studies. As a final say however, as this study worked as an initial test of a research idea and
targeted seven (out of 35 currently identified studies), we are planning to expand the number of
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studies and make it into a full review. In the full review, we would be able to draw a more
general conclusion on how consistent the PMT has been used, and better understand what if and
how it may affect the problematic fact of inconsistent results.
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